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Abstract
Immersion is a type of experience characterizing the gameplay of computer games. I propose a
phenomenological model that defines the essential  features of such experience.  I start  from the
notion of immersion as a graded experience composed by three phases: engagement, engrossment,
and total immersion or presence. Then, I put in relation these three grades with a phenomenological
framework in which I explain how the immersion is experienced by the player. In the first phase of
gameplay (engagement), players discover and learn how the game works, as well as its commands.
When she has assimilated sensorimotor skills demanded by game mechanics in her body schema,
the computer game as interactive medium becomes experientially transparent.  The player is not
longer aware of the computer game as an interactive medium, but she is experiencing a virtual
environment that appears rich of affordances and obstacles for goal-directed actions. In the second
phase (engrossment), the avatar turns into a prosthetic extension whose function is to extend the
physical  body  of  the  player  in  the  virtual  world  so  to  realize  her  intentions  and  plans.  The
experience of computer games is rooted in the prosthetic extension: through the magic of real-time
control, it is like if the player is reaching directly the world of the game by means of a prosthesis, an
extended arm. In the third phase (total immersion), the player feels like an embodied presence who
is “there”, in the game world. I suggest that presence arises only when the player can interact with
3-D game space, and when the avatar is a navigable point of view provided by camera device. Also,
the presence occurs when the player represents the game environment as an egocentric space whose
point of origin is her own body, and this is possible because of body schema's plasticity. I conclude
arguing the our embodied experience can be modified,  reshaped, by interacting with interactive
media. More specifically, the body is a nest of potentialities that can be discovered and actualized
by media, whereas the physical body is only one of its shapes.
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The problem of immersion in computer games
A computer game is “a rule-based system with a variable and quantifiable outcome, where different
outcomes are assigned different values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome,
the player feels emotionally attached to the out come, and the consequences of the activity are
negotiable” (Juul 2005, p.  36).  However,  computer games are different from any other  kind of
games because “the computer upholds the rules of the game and where the game is played using a
video display” (Juul 2005, viii). But computer games are not only a rule-based system, as they are
ludic projects that constrain a space of possibilities for the user, which means due to their design
they generate experiences, they are experiential engines, so “it is possible to describe a game as a
formal system that will then generate an experience when played” (Sicart 2008, p.  35). Interacting
with a rule-based system affects the player, who lives an qualitative experience. This experience is
the immersion.
In  game  studies  the  notion  of  immersion  has  been  frequently  discussed.  Resuming  Bateson's
metacommunication, Katie  Salen  and Eric  Zimmerman  (2003)  argue  that  playing  is  a  double-
consciousness process, wherein the player knows that what pretends to be real actions are effective
only  in  game  world,  therefore  she  is  always  aware  of  the  artificiality  of  play.  The  double-
consciousness of play is a sort of remediation that links the transparency of medium (i.e., medium's
potentiality  of  reproducing  authentically  the  real  world  or  making  an  alternate  reality)  to  the
awareness of artificiality of play (i.e.,  hypermediality,  the perception of media as designed and
artificial).  For  instance,  in  the  first-person  shooters,  such  as  Halo:  Combat  Evolved  (Bungie
Studios,  2001),  a  part  of  gameplay  experience  is  immediate,  defined  by  the  sensory  vertigo
provoked by navigating in a 3-D space. But playing this kind of computer games involves also the
awareness  of  user  interface,  as  player  employs  strategically  the  pause-game,  in-game  chat,  or
advices shared in non-ludic social contexts (e.g., social networks, web sites, forums, etc.).
As stated by Salen and Zimmerman, the immersion is not an experience of “being there”, in the
game. This fallacy occurs when players are engaged in a practical activity that seems to take an its
own “reality”, emphasizing overly the forms of pleasure elicited by engagement, and ignoring the
double consciousness grounded in the gameplay. Also, the fallacy of immersion is often supported
by the assumption that at a level of engagement and involvement, players self-identify completely
with the game's main character, so that the frame of the play fades away, losing themselves totally
inside the diegetic dimension. However, the authors claim that the relationship between player and
character is not a type of self-identification, but it is based on the double-consciousness of play. The
main character is a person through which a player engages in a fictional world. This relationship
may be deep and emotionally immersive; nevertheless, at the same time, the character is a tool, a
puppet, an object that the player manipulates  according to the rule of play. In this sense, the player
is aware fully of the character as an artificial device. 
Of course, not everybody agrees with the immersive fallacy's thesis. Game designer Ernest Adams
(2003),  for  example,  claims  that  there  are  three  types  of  immersion:  1)  tactical  immersion,  a
gameplay based on the immediate and physical flow of events, demanding reflexes and hand-eye
coordination;  it  is  what  people  call  being  “in  the  zone”  or  “in  the  groove”,  and  arises  from
challenges simple enough to allow the player to solve them in a fraction of second, while it  is
destroyed by sudden changes in gameplay (e.g., challenging boss who brakes the continuous flow
of event;  awkward controls);  2)  strategic  immersion that  arises when the gameplay demands a
search for successful strategies within a wide range of possibilities by using logic deduction in order
to achieve the wished goal, it is caused by enjoyable mental challenges and broken by awkward or
illogical  gameplay;  3)  narrative  immersion  is  a  gameplay  that  provokes  a  player's  emotional
attachment towards story's characters and a deep interest about how the story is going to end – the
player who is immersed in the narrative can tolerate an amount of low-quality strategic or tactical
gameplay, while it is created by good storytelling and destroyed but bad one (e.g., stupid characters;
inconsistent plot; clumsy dialogues).
Gordon Calleja (2007) reinterprets the immersion in terms of incorporation. The incorporation is the
subjective  experience  of  inhabiting  a  virtual  environment  facilitated  by  the  potential  to  act
meaningfully within it while being present to others. It occurs when in the gameplay the distance
between player and virtual environment fades way, so that the space of game is experienced as
surrounding environment and the avatar's actions as own acts. The incorporation takes place by two
steps:  (i)  the  incorporating,  which  is  the  assimilation  or  internalization  of  tactics  (tactical
involvement),  personal  or  designed  narratives  (narrative  involvement),  communication  and
presence of other agents (shared involvement), movements (performative involvement), within a
habitable domain (spatial involvement); (ii) the re-incorporating, that is to say the inclusion of the
player's bodily representation in the virtual environment through the avatar. 
Still, according to Yellowless Douglas and Andrew Hargadon (2000), the immersion arises from the
pleasure that the player feels when involved in the flow of familiar schemas. Schemas are data
structures that represent general concepts, knowledge about states of affairs, which allow agents to
perceive and comprehend local  data,  and eventually  to  act accordingly.  Therefore,  schemas are
perceptual expectations about what the agent perceives in the surrounding environment. The authors
claim that the pleasure felt in the storytelling derives directly from schemas, especially when the
text  matches  a  familiar  conceptual  structure.  Agents  build  schemas  about  books  or  movies
encountering  frequently  these genres,  as  well  as  reading the critics.  Schemas employ the  local
details to recognize the genre of the work informing the agents about how interpreting them. 
In  computer  games,  the  pleasure  of  immersion  arises  when  both  narrative  and  interface  are
perceived by the player through familiar schemas allowing her to enjoy the virtual experience. The
pleasure of engagement  derives from our  ability  of recognizing a  overturning or  conjoining of
conflicting schemas from a perspective outside the text. It lies in our ability to remind a set of
schemas which can direct us towards the authorial intention. Finally, the engagement brakes the
matching between text to interpret and interpreter's schemas, making decrease the immersion. 
Nevertheless, according to Douglas and Hargadon, some computer games can be both immersive
and engaging. In some of them, where the narrative immersion dominates, it  is possible to find
some features of the engagement as they demand to gamer/reader to search for the schemas more
appropriate to progress across the text. For example,  L.A. Noire  (Team Bondi, 2011) has features
typical of thriller books, but the player is not only immersed in the narrative to the extent that she
must use detective intuition and logical deduction to query the suspects, understanding who is lying,
combining the clues, and choosing who to accuse of murder. At the same time, even some engaging
computer games show immersive elements such as dramatic suspense, chronological and causal
sequences of events. The pleasure of reading an interactive medium is much strong when there is a
balance between immersion and engagement.
Immersion as a graded experience
As we have seen, there are different points of view on what is immersion. However, I think a good
starting point can be the model of immersion as a graded experience (Brown and Cairns, 2004;
Jennett, Cox, and Cairns, 2009). While in virtual reality systems the immersion is immediate, in
computer games takes more time and discloses gradually through three progressive levels – where
“progressive” means that the player can experience a lower level without experiencing the higher
ones:
1. engagement: the user invests time, effort and attention in order to learn how to play and
master game's controls;
2. engrossment: player's emotions are directly affected by the game (it depends on how the
game has been designed: plot; graphics; interesting targets);
3. total immersion or presence: the player feels like “being there”, in a synthetic environment,
like it was immediate, therefore she is detached from everyday reality and responds only to
what occurs in the game world (it demands a high level of attention, and it is harder to reach
than the previous two). 
The first step of immersion is engagement that consists in investing time, efforts and attention in
order to learn and master game's controls. This phase ends when the player is able to achieve a
flow-like  state  characterized  by  temporal  dissociation,  sense  of  control  on  the  game,  sense  of
challenge,  emotional  involvement,  attentional  focus,  balance  between  challenges  and  skills
(Csikszentmihalyi,  2009).  Nevertheless,  unlike  the  flow,  the  immersion  is  not  an  extreme
experience (Cowley et al., 2008), but arises mainly when there is a full matching between the level
of challenge and the player's  skills.  The experience of engagement thus starts  from a phase of
detuning between player and rules of game and ends in a phase of full tuning, which is a flow-like
state. The phase of tuning is broken only when the player meets a new challenge that demands the
extension, improvement, and enhancement of skills.
This phase unfolds as a process of  assimilation or  internalization of game's controls in the body
schema. The body schema includes the proprioception, i.e. semi-automatic mechanisms that adjust
steadily the posture, and a system of sensorimotor skills that allows to control and perform the
intentional actions (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). Learning a sensorimotor skill, such as controlling
the avatar's movement in a 3D environment, takes place gradually. Initially, the player focus on
sensorimotor correlations produced while she is performing a task in the game. For example, the
perceptual system of player detects that the pressure on the handle's joystick toward the left of her
body (proprioception) makes a recurrent sensory variation, such as the kinematics of images on
display. When the regularity in these correlations has been detected and assimilated, the player does
not pay more attention on action's control, so that her body tends to disappear, turning transparent.
Most  of  everyday  actions  are  performed  without  focusing  attention  on  body's  performances,
because the agent is using sensorimotor skills assimilated by the body schema. The same is true for
those skills demanded by computer games.
The assimilation of game's controls is constrained by two factors (Jennett, Cox, and Cairns, 2009).
First,  submission  to  the  game,  namely  in  computer  games  the  interaction  with  the  virtual
environment is limited to a number of pre-set gestures that due to arbitrary nature (e.g., pushing A
button to kick an opponent) need a full internalization of controls in order to become transparent:
the player must submit to game's mechanics, accepting limits and the bounds fixed by the medium.
Computer games try to overcome these limitations by the pleasure of play felt by player when she
experiences a great sense of control on the virtual environment. 
Second, during gaming it seems to take place two forms of disembodiment. The player begins to
ignore her  physical  body (i.e.,  body that pushes the button on the keyboard,  moves the mouse
allowing the images on display to unfold) and focus on what happens to her virtual body: the avatar
is internalized by the player. Then, the virtual body itself turns transparent as it is overshadowed by
intentions and plans that player tries to achieve and realize in the game world.
The second phase of immersion is engrossment. The main feature of engrossment is involvement,
which discloses six possible experiences (Calleja, 2007): 
1. tactical involvement, brought out by game mechanics demanding action planning based on
calculation of interdependent variables (e.g., real-time or turn-based strategy games); 
2. performative involvement, provoked by the sense of control on digital agent's movement; 
3. affective involvement,  elicited by a gameplay that affects player's emotional states (e.g.,
pleasure, fear, frustration, anger); 
4. share involvement, caused by a gameplay that occurs in shared environments (e.g., MMO
games), where players' actions are public, she can build a reputation, and join social groups;
5. narrative involvement,  put in  motion by the emotional  attachment  to  characters  and the
interest in plot, or by making a personal narrative (i.e., emergent story);
6. spatial  involvement,  provided by the internalization of  a  game's area (i.e.,  maps,  levels,
regions or worlds) in order to locate oneself within it. 
In this phase, three kinds of identity (Gee, 2008) play a role in player's immersion: (i) the real
identity, that is all the physical, psychological, cultural and social features, as well as sensorimotor
skills,  that  determine  the  identity  of  an  embodied  person;  (ii)  the  virtual  identity,  namely  the
protagonist's  identity  that  is  defined by the  game design,  aims  and beliefs  prespecified  by the
designer; (iii) the projective identity that it has to be intended in two ways: the player's values and
desires that are projected in the avatar, and the perception of avatar as a tool through which to
achieve them. So, in this phase, computer games are nothing else than “action- and goal-directed
simulations of embodied experience” (Gee 2007, p. 254). Character's virtual mind and body turn
into a surrogate of player's mind and body. The avatars are extensions of player's body through
which executes  actions  and goals that  need a  digital  representation of body to unfold in  game
environment. Only when the player's purposes coincide with virtual character's designed aims, it
occurs an identification of the player with the virtual identity  - which, nevertheless, must be not
confused with the sense of presence since a player can take hold of virtual character's purposes and,
at the same time, does not feel “in the game”, using the avatar simply as a prosthetic extension of
her physical body.
Presence is not a mere identification or absorption of embodied subject with a virtual agent: when
she feels presence, is not Ezio Auditore, Lara Croft or Alan Wake. Presence concerns the player as
embodied agent, that is to say her real identity, and it occurs even without the projective attitude –
which can promote it at best. As I will show, since in order to orientate, locate oneself and drive the
behavior purposely in game world the embodied subject uses her body axes instantiated by a virtual
body, it is more correct to say that she is there actually by means of avatar's vicarious body. When
the player moves and acts in the game world by using her own body axes, she is like “there”, “in the
game”, as both proprioceptive and sensorimotor systems are operating in such a experience. 
My phenomenological  approach  has  found the  conditions  of  possibility  of  immersion  in  three
phenomenical  features:  the  transparency  of  medium,  the  prosthetic  extension,  and  the  (tele-)
presence. Only when user-game interaction implements those conditions, immersion discloses.
Transparency of medium
The transparency of medium is the condition of engagement phase. It occurs in gaming when the
player  is  not  longer  aware  of  her  physical  body  (i.e.,  she  does  not  focus  attention  on  bodily
movements) and the medium (i.e., computer) as well,  turning experientially  transparent. Player-
controlled avatar turns into an extension of player's physical body, a “digital surrogate” of real body
through which the player performs goal-oriented actions in the game world. It occurs when the
player  by  interacting  with  game environment  discovers  kinesthetic-tactil  correlations,  recurrent
sensorimotor loops which will be assimilated in the body schema.
The transparency of the body arises when the sensorimotor skills, learned during gameplay,  are
integrated in the player's body schema (i.e.,  they become automatic or semi-automatic), namely the
system of  bodily  capacities  and  sensorimotor  skills  that  support  our  goal-oriented  actions  and
operates without perceptive monitoring (Gallagher 2005, pp. 26-31). The body turns transparent
because an implicit sensorimotor and embodied knowledge is employed in the execution of own
actions: when a sensorimotor skill is assimilated, which means the agent is well-trained, agent's
bodily  motion  is  overshadowed,  and the  attentional  focus  is  fully  addressed  to  intentions.  For
example, if I try to reach a water glass with the intention of drinking, my hand and sensorimotor
coordination are fully out of my awareness, while I  am aware only of my conscious intention.
However, my hand conforms precisely and automatically to the shape of glass in order to grab it
due to an implicit sensorimotor skill. It occurs in every practical activity. For instance, when I catch
a ball, I do not pay attention to the complex sensorimotor coordination enacted by my body, I am
just aware of the intentional action of catching it, my attention is fully addressed to that action but
not to bodily motion. 
Experiential transparency does not concern only parts of physical body, but even physical tools
when absorbed in body schema. Think about driving a car. A well-trained driver does not focus
attention on the spatial position of the gear shift, steering wheel, accelerator or clutch pedal, as well
as to the hand-motion to change gears or foot-motion to push the accelerator. She is not aware of the
car as well as her bodily movement, bur rather attention is fully directed to the goal of intentional
action (e.g., going to a place): the car turns transparent, just like the parts of the physical body when
an intentional  project  is  actualized.  For  example,  when a well-trained driver  has  to  move in a
narrow street, she is not longer aware of the distance between the car and the sidewalks, but  already
knows whether she can go through or not, just like she already knows whether her body can go
through a door or not. This means the car is turned into an extension of the body of the well-trained
driver,  so  that  concurs  to  determine  a  range  of  new skills  that  may be  used  to  achieve  many
intentional projects.
User-tool assimilation concerns the graded experience of immersion too. First, user discovers lawful
sensorimotor correlations between her body, interface, and game environment. At a first stage, when
she  interacts  with  the  tool  (e.g.,  press  controller's  knob   by  a  thumb),  the  player  experiences
kinesthetic-tactil links between body motion (i.e., finger's movement) and sensory variations (e.g.,
the knob that bends to the finger's pressure). That kind of sensorimotor correlation is recurrent, as
anytime that is enacted a class of movements will produce a class of sensory variations coming
from the controllers. At the same time, the same class of movements is always coupled with another
class of sensory variations, that is the avatar's locomotion toward a direction of game environment.
At a second stage, therefore, the user discovers lawful correlations between such a class of bodily
movements and such a class of in-game sensory variations, which operates as sensory feedbacks
that accordingly will affect the next player's movements.
Second,  by  the  practice,  the  player  will  be  progressively  less  aware  of  sensorimotor  lawful
correlations, until they will completely turn transparent while she can focus  totally on the conscious
intentions achievable just by virtue of them. In computer games with 3D graphics in which the
avatar is a first-person perspective, such as Half-Life 2 (Valve Corporation, 2004), the transparency
is achieved gradually when the player discovers the sensorimotor laws between the fingers' motion
on the keyboard and the sensorimotor variations produced by the avatar's locomotion. She uses
some fingers of the left hand to press keys on the keyboard (usually W-A-S-D) and the right hand to
move the mouse. While left hand moves the avatar's head, the right hand the whole digital body. By
exploring,  manipulating  and  moving  in  the  virtual  environment,  the  player  uncovers  the  laws
inherent  to  the  correlations  between  the  hand  motion  and  the  sensory  variations  (i.e.,  visual
outputs). When these laws are assimilated in player's body schema, the transparency occurs. I guess
that the lawful correlations in computer games are well encoded in game code by programmers,
whereas in real life they are nested in the interaction between the animal and ambient. 
Howsoever, in gaming, when the transparency of medium arises, the player is not longer aware of
computer game as an interactive medium, but feels a virtual environment rich of affordances and
obstacles  for  goal-directed  actions.  What  she  experiences  is  not  her  own  physical  body,  the
interfaces (i.e., controller, console, display) or the computer game as an object, but she perceives a
world  with  things  to  do,  goals  to  achieve,  and dangers  to  avoid.  This  is  possible  because  the
assimilation  of  avatar's  limitations  and  skills  in  the  body  schema  discloses  a  new  range  of
possibilities and choices that could not be achieved by the physical body. When it happens, the
experience of immersion evolves in the second phase: the prosthetic extension.
Prosthetic extension
Prosthetic extension is the embodiment in the body schema of tools and objects located outside the
physical boundaries of the body in order to achieve goals and perform actions. It is well known that
our body schema is really plastic and dynamic, as it can be reshaped during the experience and
extended beyond the body's boundaries through the embodiment of external objects or everyday
tools (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Noë, 2009):
the body schema is a flexible and extendible form depending on the intentional projects, which
means its boundaries change in relation to the agent's intentionality.
In computer gaming, the player embodies in the body schema the avatar's digital body. Therefore,
the avatar turns into a prosthetic extension whose function is to extend the physical body of the
player in the game's virtual world so that she can achieve a number of pre-set goal-directed actions.
Since  Spacewars!, the experience of computer gaming was grounded in the prosthetic extension:
through the magic of real-time control, it is like if the player is reaching directly the world of the
game by means of a prosthesis, an extended arm (Klevjer 2012, p. 19).
This feature arises only in the engrossment phase when the player uses the prosthetic extension to
achieve  intentional  projects  in  the  game  environment.  Since  she  has  an  implicit  sensorimotor
knowledge of  interface,  obtained in  the engagement  phase,  the  player  feels  the avatar  to  obey
directly to her will using it as the effector of action planning. Digital body's designed structure
predetermines affordances and obstacles of goal-directed in-game actions, constraining the actions
which the player will be able to do in the virtual world. The game world, accordingly, will appear
habitable, full of familiar things or activities, because the player has embodied in body schema the
digital body's constraints: now virtual body's possibilities of action are experienced by the player as
her own possibilities. This computer representation of body is turned into the player's extended arm
by means of which she can reach the digital world.
Condition for the prosthetic extension is the inherent coherence of kinaesthetic-tactile correlations
put  in  place  during  gameplay.  The  basis  of  this  experience  is  a  mechanism  of  multisensory
integration in which visuo-auditory (i.e., game's outputs), kinaesthetic (i.e., hand-eye motion) and
tactile (i.e., holding, handling the controller) data are integrated in a whole subjective experience
that  is  the  feeling  to  act  in  the  game.  When the  player  is  playing,  discovers  coherence  in  the
sensorimotor  correlations  used  as  expectations  about  game's  events.  When  a  sensorimotor
coherence has been uncovered and assimilated, such as “if I move the joystick ahead, the avatar
moves forward”, the player awaits that a class of real movements (e.g., finger's movement forward)
matches an exact class of sensory feedbacks in the virtual environment (e.g., avatar's locomotion
ahead). Therefore, the player experiences the act of controlling the avatar because a set of her real
motion is lawfully linked to a sensory experience happening in the game world: this is a practical
knowledge that involves the player's expectations on the game's events which can be used in order
to drive the avatar's behavior in virtual environment and achieve personal purposes within it, as well
as  the  designed  ones.  Discovering  and  assimilating  sensorimotor  correlations  contributes  in  a
decisive way to extend the boundaries of own body and incorporate in the bodily experience even
the inanimate objects. Due to the practice, the agent can assimilate inanimate object in body schema
so as to be employable as transparent effectors of intentional actions, like they were parts conjunct
with the rest of agent's physical body. 
The prosthetic extension involves the extension of the sense of agency (i.e., the feeling of initiating
and controlling the own actions) in the game world. The sense of agency mediated by the prosthetic
extension is promoted by two factors. First, the control of action in the game's environment. During
the phase of engagement, the player apprehends the commands, assimilates them in body schema,
and discovers  recurrent  lawful  correlations  between hand-eye motion and sensory variations  as
effects of in-game events. The player therefore comes to an implicit sensorimotor knowledge of the
game  world  that  could  be  employed  to  drive  the  intentional  actions  and  achieve  the
personal/designed goals within it.  The second factor is an intentional project encapsulated in the
different types of involvement and self-identification with the virtual character. The player feels to
be the author of the game's actions because she is doing something within it, that is to say because
she is achieving an intentional project. The sensorimotor skills are just a function of the player's
intentional  project  and not  the other  way.  This  would explain also why the players  experience
certain in-game actions as own actions even though they use poorer and more limited skills than
those in real world. Notwithstanding the actual movement performed to achieve a certain purpose in
virtual world is not the same type of that put in place to reach the same purpose in real world, the
two movements are experienced in any case as multiple motor modalities employable to achieve
same identical intention. Consider the relationship between the motor ability of jumping a fence in
treal world and the corresponding ability in Assassin's Creed III's world (Ubisoft Montreal, 2012).
In the real world, an ability of this kind requires the involvement of the tendons and the muscles of
the legs (i.e., they must bend in order to produce the necessary power for elevation), arms (for the
leap) and hands (to grab the support).  In  Assassin's Creed III's  designed environment,  the only
sensorimotor ability required to achieve this goal (i.e. jumping a fence) is to keep pressing forward
the controller's knob and the button to which the designer has assigned arbitrarily the action of
jumping. Therefore in this type of game world, the intentional action of jumping a fence involves
the execution of a very different motor program that includes the tendons and the muscle of the
fingers, hands, wrist and arm. However, what enables the agent to experience the execution of the
intentional actions in the game environment is not the sensorimotor ability itself rather the fact that
the agent is able to fulfill the same intentional project by two different motor programs achieved in
two worlds with which she can interact very differently. Therefore the bridge that links those two
different sensorimotor skills is the agent's intentional project, they are thus two distinct ways to do
the same thing. So, it is possible to experience the intentions in the game world even though we are
not performing the same movements that we would do in real world because, on the one hand, due
the artificial nature of the medium, the game environment has rules of interaction different from
those we find in real world, and on the other hand, because in any case the players are able to
achieve intentional projects within it. For this reason, video games allow the player to realize her
own intentional projects by developing sensorimotor skills alternatives to those demanded by the
normal interaction with the real world.  In this sense,  when the player has learned the practical
knowledge of how to interact with the virtual environment by incorporating the avatar in body
schema, the avatar itself turns in a body extension of the player through which to realize intentional
projects and achieve goals in the game: by means of the avatar as a prosthetic extension the player
is enabled to do things in the game world. 
 
The presence, or “being in the game”
All computer games extend the player's sense of agency in the game world, that is the feeling of
controlling actions and acting purposely within it.  Such extension is the condition for a type of
immersion through which the player feels like being in the game with a part of body – the prosthetic
extension. However, the player's embodied experience still stays in the physical world. It is like if
the player had stretched the prosthetic extension of her arm or finger in the virtual environment,
whereas the local space where she is physically located has been broadened. The player is not
present in the virtual environment, but it is the latter to be present in the surrounding space: in this
case the immersion is not a “being there”, but rather an “it is here” (Floridi, 2005). This kind of
immersion masters the engrossment phase whose main feature is the prosthetic extension, but it is
not a kind of presence that involves the player's whole body.
In a deeper grade of immersion the player feels like to be in the game, a bodily presence in a virtual
environment. This type of presence has been often defined as the perceptual illusion of being in a
immediate environment (Steuer, 1992; Lombard and Ditton, 1997; Slater, 1999). This phenomenon
involves real-time responses of cognitive, perceptual, sensory, and affective systems with objects
and entities  located  in  the  virtual  environment,  and occurs  when a  person fails  to  perceive  or
recognize the existence of the medium in environmental communication and responds to it like
there was an immediate physical environment. The presence as a perceptual illusion occurs when
the medium appears invisible or transparent,  so that the user seems to share the same physical
environment with the medium's contents (i.e., objects, entities).
However, is immersion just a player's illusion actually? In my opinion, it is not. According to some
scholars (Mantovani, 1995; Zahorik and Jenison, 1998), the thesis of immersion as a perceptual
illusion refers implicitly to the ontology of naif realism that conceives the reality as a well-defined
set of objects located outside the mind. In the act of knowing, the subject perceives the state of these
pre-existing  objects.  The  naif  realism  explains  the  relationship  between  actual  and  virtual
environments as the relationship between actual and simulated states of affairs, where the latter
appear like if they were real causing thus a persuasive perception, but illusory too, of actual objects.
By the naif  realism, the virtual  environments  are  spaces of  consensual hallucinations in  which
human perceptual systems fail considering an illusory state of affairs as “real”. Consequently, who
endorses this ontology posits a distinction between “natural” immediate and “artificial” mediated
experiences (Steuer, 1992). Hence, such traditional approach promotes the understanding of virtual
presence as the epistemic failure of recognizing the technologically mass-mediated nature of her
own experiences.
Nevertheless, this approach has been criticized from multiple points of view. The first objection is
about its ontology. Such approach, in fact, opposes virtual reality and actual reality, as the latter is
apodictically indisputable. But this is not true. Since even the experience of the actual reality is
mediated, to the extent that according to the naif realism there is a gap between subject and object
filled by mental representations which mediate between inner and outer world, in principle it is
logically  possible  the  solipsism (i.e.,  physical  world  does  not  exist  actually,  all  what  exists  is
subjective, a mental world). For instance, it could be possible that our mental representations are not
connected to the outer world but rather to a super-computer that simulates a non-existent world
(e.g., Putnam, 1981).
Also, it is been remarked that the distinction between mediated and natural perception is futile, as
even the latter  is mediated to the extent that the sensory stimuli must be always interpreted by
higher cognitive functions (e.g., memory, emotion, cognition) in order to drive the behavior (Min
Lee, 2004). Accordingly, the presence is always mediated both by physical (e.g., physical body,
technological devices) and culture-dependent conceptual tools, that means the “physical” presence
is not more real or truer than immersion in a virtual environment.  As the perceptual-motory loop
occurs both in an actual and virtual environment,  there is not intrinsic difference in the stimuli
coming from both (Ijsselsteijn and Riva, 2003). The fact that we can feel the presence in one or
other depends on which perception is dominant in a given time: in fact, the computer-generated and
local environment compete for subject's  limited attentional resources, so that tele-presence (i.e.,
presence in a virtual world) takes place only when many perceptual and cognitive resources are
allocated in the digital environment rather than in physical one (Draper, Kaber, and Usher, 1999). In
fact, a perception prevails over another only when the attention focuses on it because of bottom-up
or  top-down  psychological  processes  (e.g.,  in  a  mediated  environment,  the  presence  could  be
strengthened if the environment is perceptually salient). 
Other critics have questioned whether the presence is an epistemic failure of not recognizing the
mediated nature of the perception. As philosopher Luciano Floridi (2005) remarked, the epistemic
failure entails that a participant, who does not fail to recognize the technologically mediated nature
of her own experience, cannot be tele-present in a remote or virtual environment. But a doctor may
keep to operate a patient with success at distance, even if he is aware of the mediate nature of such
perception.  Or,  a  soldier  can  be  tele-present  in  a  minefield  by a  robot,  regardless  the  possible
perception  of  the artificial  nature  of  his   experience.  In  short,  a  subject  can be tele-present  to
something  both  whether  she  is  aware  or  not  of  the  technologically  mediated  nature  of  own
experience.  
Presence and computer games
Alison McMahan (2003) argues that computer games can facilitate the presence when they fulfill
one or more of presence's six dimensions characterizing even the experience of virtual reality too: 
1. the quality of social interaction: if the game design facilitates the sense of “being together”
through a shared environment, namely a space wherein user's actions can be seen by the
other  participants,  and  in  which  it  is  possible  to  carry  out  collaborative  activities,  the
presence will arise during gameplay – in fact, in computer games, shared environments (e.g.,
multiplayer FPS) and gameplay designed for the social interaction (e.g., MMOs) are heavily
used to let emerge the presence;
2. the  environmental  realism (i.e.,  graphics,  sound):  in  computer  games  the  environmental
realism can be promoted by social realism, when the medium reproduces events or activities
that usually take place or could happen in the immediate social world (e.g., in Elder Scrolls
v:  Skyrim it  is  possible  to  celebrate  weddings,  coronations,  religious  rites),  and  the
perceptual realism, which depends on virtual environment's degree of similarity with the real
world, indeed as we know nowadays a big amount of computer games manifests graphics
tending to the photorealism;
3. the feeling of “transport” - the sense of “being there”, “here” or “together” -  generated by
the interface that reproduces the navigation in 3D environments; in computer games there
are several interfaces that do that, such as immersive devices for virtual reality (e.g., Oculus
Rift, Project Morpheus) or mimetic controls that enable to execute in the local environment
the same motor dynamics that the player is performing in the virtual one (e.g, Wii Remote,
PS Move,  Kinect) – in other words, the presence is much more likely elicited when the
game's  interface  involves  the  player's  proprioceptive  and  motor  system,  indeed  if  the
matching between proprioception (i.e., player's actual movements) and sensory feedbacks
(i.e., in-game events resulting by player's actions) is coherent, the user will self-identify with
the  virtual  body:  the  presence  is  much  more  strong  when  the  mental  model  of  the
participant's  body  corresponds  to  the  representation  of  virtual  body  in  the  digital
environment (Slater and Usoh, 1993);
4. the  grade  of  immersivity generated  by  the  interface  involving  the  perceptual  and
psychological immersion – on the one hand, the perceptual immersion can be favored by
blocking the sense organs' access to the external world so that the user can perceive only the
artificial  world  (e.g.,  headset,  gloves,  head-mounted  display);  on  the  other  hand,  the
psychological immersion depends on the player's ability to perform actions in the artificial
world, such interaction produces psychological states (e.g., survival horror games can  cause
heavy emotional state, such as anxiety, stress), also the plot may play a relevant role in such
type of immersion;
5. using social synthetic actors in the medium, such as computer-controlled characters or game
environment's mechanics (e.g., sea's waves);
6. medium's  techniques  of  responding as  a social  and intelligent  agent,  for  example  often
computer games contain also tutorials that introduce the player the commands, or sometimes
arrows or orders indicating a location where to go that set the next goal, in this case the
computer game as medium turns in a sort of intelligent and social agent that provide the user
advices. 
Furthermore, it has been remarked that the sense of presence in computer games is qualitatively
different from the presence in virtual reality (Jennett, Cox, and Cairns, 2009). The reasons are two
in essence. Firstly, the submission to the game: while in virtual reality systems (VR) the virtual
environment (VE) is reached in a total way, in computer games it is limited to small displays. Also,
in computer games, the interaction with EV is narrowed to standard poor gestures that, because of
their arbitrary nature (e.g, pressing button A to kick an opponent) demands a total internalization of
the  controls  to  turn  transparent:  therefore  the  player  must  submit,  that  is  to  say  accept,  the
sensorimotor constraints settled by game world's inner mechanics. Computer games try to overcome
these limitations with the “pleasure of the game” that the player feels when experiences a great
feeling of control in EV playing an active role within in it.
Second, the de-corporation: whereas in RV systems the participant is still herself, in the game an
user's de-corporation occur. The player starts to ignore her physical body (i.e., body that presses the
buttons  on the keyboard,  moves the mouse,  let  the images  on screen flow) and focus on what
happens to her virtual body: so the player internalizes her own avatar, turning in it. Successively, the
virtual body is totally transparent as overshadowed by the in-game actions executed by the player.
In any case, if the presence is not a mere perceptual illusion, it must be a genuine experience that
involves the extension of the sense of agency, as the player feels her body (i.e.,  body schema)
wholly in the game. The total immersion manifests an experience of a player's bodily reallocation
from the physical to the game world. Also, the presence is not technological-specific because it does
not depend on the technology but occurs indiscriminately in local, remote, and virtual environments
(Ijsselsteijn and Riva, 2003;  Floridi 2005). Not all computer games have mechanics that let arise
this  kind  of  experience  (Nunez  and  Blake,  2006).  Otherwise,  not  all  players  experience  the
presence, even when they play computer games with 3D graphics, although the participants who
deny such experience may be reluctant to admit the sense of presence, perhaps due to social or
cultural biases towards such medium (Jannett, Cox and Cairns 2008). 
Only some computer games let arise the presence, why? Some computer games, in particular with
2D graphics, let to spring a type of immersion that we have defined engrossment or involvement
that concerns only the prosthetic extension. In 2-D games the player does not feel totally in the
game, but she experiences only a part of her own body within it in order to perform intentional
actions. I suggest that, in computer gaming, the introduction of 3-D environments, navigable and
explorable by a camera, has given rise to a new grade of immersion in which the player feels bodily
present.  If  in  2-D  graphics  games  the  player  performs  intentional  actions  by  an  extension  of
physical body, in 3-D graphics games, the player can achieve purposes by a whole body feeling thus
bodily situated in it. 
Presence and egocentric spatial frame of reference in computer games
When does such a presence emerge during the gameplay? It occurs when the player represents the
game space in a egocentric and situated way. Such a perception involves the reallocation of player's
body schema in the virtual world. The egocentric and situated space are essential features of the
presence in gaming. We can understand better how this works by referring to three experiences of
play. 
First, the experience of self-locomotion. In gameplay, the player can experience two types of self-
locomotion:  passive  or  active.  On the  one  hand,  the  passive  self-locomotion  is  an  involuntary
movement felt when the body's perceived movement has been not caused by ourself but an external
agent. On the other hand, the active self-locomotion is a voluntary movement when agent feels to be
the author of body's movement. To experience these kinds of self-locomotion the subject must have
the sense of ownness, the feeling of owning a body that can be put in motion by an external agent,
or the experience of being the author of a perceived bodily movement. And this is possible only
because we are that body.
In computer games we experience the self-locomotion, which means we feel to own a body, that can
be put in motion by ourself or an external agent. For example, in  Dead Island (Techland, 2011),
zombies can hit the avatar and make him fall down. When this happens, the player is able to feel
this movement as not caused by herself but rather by an artificial agent. From which kind of player's
ability does this distinction derive? I suggest this occurs because the player's sense of ownness has
been extended in the body's avatar. If this had not happened, the player would be only a passive
viewer of what is happening in a fictional world. On the contrary, she is enabled to experience
whether  a  perceived  motion  seen  on  screen  refers  to  her  as  bodily  agent  situated  in  virtual
environment or to something else, and whether it is a self-locomotion caused by an external agent
or herself. It is possible because the player feels to own a body situated in the game world to the
extent that her sense of ownness has been extended in it by incorporating the body's avatar in the
body schema. 
Second, the experience of the spatial navigation in a 3D-graphics environment. Spatial navigation in
3D games involves an egocentric space, as the player explores the virtual environment by means of
her own bodily axes. For example, consider The Elder Scrolls v: Skyrim (Bethesda Game Studios,
2011) (fig. 1). When the player moves in the fantasy world of Skyim, she perceives the objects
located in the game space to the left/right, back/forward, here/there, and up/down, that is to say in a
space  whose point  of  origin  is  the  player's  body.  During gameplay,  when the  player  is  totally
engaged with the in-game actions,  she does not think that the dragon is to the left of the avatar, but
she  localizes  the  roaring  beast  to  her  left.  The  fact  that  the  player  represents  the  game space
egocentrically is more clear when she identifies the positions of items within it. 
A well-trained player is able, in fact, to recognize places where she has been, in order to guide
smoothly her behavior, even without assistance of external maps. For instance, in the wide world of
Skyrim, often the player comes back to the same places (e.g., dungeons) wherein had left some
items in order to withdraw them. To do this, she must recognize exactly the place that had visited
before. Now, identifying a place where you have been means to recognize that specific place as a
“here”, a place “where I was” (Evans, 1982). This involves the employment of a mental map whose
space is represented in an egocentric and perspective way, to the extent that the gamer identifies the
positions of items in locations wherein had been present not in third person perspective (i.e., she
does not think “the place where my avatar has been”), but in first person (i.e, “the place where  I
was”). Indeed, when she enters in a dungeon represents the 3D space by coordinates such as “to the
left, then right, forward, and again left”. 
Fig.  1. Egocentric  perspective  space  in  a  computer  game.  Game
design uses a first person view, but space's axes are specified by the
player's  body  (left/right,  forward/behind,  up/down).  Actually  the
point of origin is transparent, as grounded in the body schema of the
player.
Third,  communication  among  players  in  multiplayer  mode.  For  example,  in  The  Last  of  Us
(Naughty Dog, 2013), the players must communicate each others continuously in order to indicate
the local positions of supplies or possible dangers, such as enemies or land mines. In this game, the
communication among teammates is essential to succeed to avoid possible ambushes or effectuate
coordinate strategies. Frequently, the teams move within the post-apocalyptic scenarios as a single
agent with a distributed intelligence. Now, while communicating, they use typical coordinates of an
egocentric space, and the accuracy by which the 3D space is represented egocentrically is primary
to win the match (fig. 2). They say, for instance, that the sniper is in the upper right, the supplies are
up ahead, behind a car, or the medkit is located to the left, in front of a sofa. These are coordinates
that have as point of origin the player's body. Otherwise, the player could not understand what the
teammate are saying, because spatial terms such as “here”, “there”, “behind”, “forward”, “up” are
specified only like motor dynamics that our body must execute to achieve situated goals. 
Fig. 2. Another example of egocentric (body-centered) space
in a computer game. In spite of third-person view, the point
of origin of the space is still  the player's body, and during
gameplay it is transparent. Indeed, the third-person character
is experienced as a prosthetic extension of the avatar, which
is  the  digital  body  (camera),  assimilated  in  player's  body
schema,  by  means  of  which  the  user  access  to  the  game
world.
The egocentric space is, in fact, “the perspective space of perception and action that is defined
relative to the perceiving or acting body” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 141). It represents the
position of objects in a space relative to the body's axes of the subject (Evans, 1982; Peacocke,
1992; Gallagher, 2005). So if in game code the items are located in objective positions specified by
three dimensional vector (x, y, z), in the gameplay they are located in a egocentric perspective space
whose axes have their point of origins in the player's body (i.e., left/right, forward/behind, up/down)
and specified by the practical knowledge of the action that the agent must perform to identify them.
The player moves thus in a egocentric space for two reasons:
1. the point of origin of 3D game space wherein she acts is her own body, as the coordinates of
this space are specified by body's axes – if the 3D game space was not body-centered, the
player  would  locate  items  in  an  allocentric  space  (e.g.,  objective  space  and  locations
encoded in game code), a purely objective space that can be defined in terms of latitude and
longitude or in the terms of compass direction;
2. the player has an implicit practical knowledge of the actions that must perform in order to
identify objects within it, which means the representation of egocentric space depends on the
body schema, structured by the proprioceptive system and sensorimotor skills. 
In an egocentric space objects and surfaces are organized around a single and privileged point of
origin: perceiver's body. As philosopher Shaun Gallagher remarks, “one of the important functions
of the body in the context of perception and action is to provide the basis for an egocentric spatial
frame of reference” (Gallagher 2005, p. 59). Also, “every perspectival appearance implies that the
embodied perceiver is herself the experiential origin, the indexical 'here' in relation to which every
appearing object is oriented” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 161).
If the cognitive use of egocentric (body-centered) space implies the presence of own body as point
of origin, whose axes are specified by perceiver's body schema, and if the player orientates in 3D
game environments by an egocentric  space,  therefore  she is  in  the game with her  whole body
because such spatial experience is defined by perceiver's body schema. This means that in the tele-
presence takes place a spatial relocation of body schema, that is to say the body itself.
Also, the coordinates of egocentric space are specified by the possible actions that the body is able
to perform (Briscoe, 2008). The structure of body constraints or provides opportunities for action:
the axes of egocentric space are defined by the practical understanding of the possible actions that a
body can do, in other words, they depends on the agent's body schema. In a 3-D space, I perceive
something to the left because I can move my left arm in order to reach a certain object. Movements
of my left arm constrain the left/right axes in a deep way such that if I can reach by my right arm an
object located to my left, I will perceive this action as my right arm that grabs an object to my left.
From a phenomenological point of view, the intentional action is essential to identify the position of
a object within an egocentric space, to the extent that the point of origin of this kind of experiential
space is dynamical, it can be the whole body in a undifferentiated way, but even a specific part of
body depending on the intentional action in act (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Sometimes, the point of
origin is the body's part involved in the (possible) purposeful action: something is represented to my
left because the point of origin of the spatial frame is not my head or torso, but the left arm that is
able to reach the object, as I have a practical knowledge of how to grab the object. What does it
mean? It  means  that  if  the  player  uses  her  bodily  axes  to  navigate  in  a  3-D game space,  the
dynamical point of origin of her spatial frame has been relocated in the avatar itself, as the latter has
been assimilated in her body schema.
In fact, the representation of egocentric space occurs progressively through the assimilation of a
practical  knowledge,  or  else  through  the  acquisition  of  sensorimotor  skills  to  perform specific
intentional actions. In computer games with 3-D environments, the construction of egocentric space
is possible as the player, in virtue of game interface, is enabled to execute intentional actions (e.g.,
rotating around a bodily axis to see what there is behind) achievable only if she was physically
there, in the game world. Since the player can perform successfully a wide range of intentional
actions   in  the game environment,  she feels  like being there.  What  she are  experiencing is  an
embodied presence in   a  game world,  which is  explorable by bodily movements  (e.g.,  fingers'
movements  on controller)  different  from those demanded by real  world,  even though they are
intentionally identical. In other words, the player apprehends to execute in-game intentional actions
in a different way to the sensorimotor dynamics demanded to the usual interaction with the real
world. However, what differentiates that experience of game world and real world is not a sort of
illusion, but the different range of sensorimotor skills demanded to perform the  same  intentions,
which are so achievable in both the worlds. Therefore, the player understands what she is doing or
seeing  in  the  game  world,  because  the  meaning  of  simulated  actions  does  not  depend  on  the
sensorimotor  dynamics,  but  rather  by the  agent's  intentions  which can be achieved in  multiple
worlds and by multiple ways. 
Presence, camera and 3-D environment in computer games
Prima facie, in computer games, the presence seems to be triggered by a specific interactive device:
a  camera  manipulated  by  the  player  like  it  was  her  whole  body,  and not  just  a  part  of  it.  In
particular, the avatar is a first- and third-person perspective settled by an interface consisting of a
camera put on or lightly distant from avatar's body (e.g., on the head, behind). Camera is an user-
interface which enables the player to navigate, explore, feel, listen and see a computer-generated 3-
D environment. By this device, the avatar's body is not just an object, but it is also an embodied
presence who is “there”, “in the game” with a body, whose spatial frames are nested in the player's
body schema. Some scholars have argued that the grade of presence in virtual environments is
directly proportional to the graphic realism in terms of grade fidelity with the real world (Slater and
Wilbur, 1997). Nevertheless, the player can experience the presence regardless the graphics realism,
as such feeling is promoted by virtual environments wherein the participant can act ecologically
(Mantovani and Riva, 1999): the presence is tied to embodied agent's successfully supported action
in  the  environment,  both  real  or  virtual  (Zahorik  and  Jenison,  1998).  As  Rune  Klevjer  has
underlines, “the point is not to simulate the ‘configuration’ of our real bodies, but to simulate the
configuration  of some kind of body”  (Klevjer 2007, p. 149). 
In short, when the game interface provides the player a kind of body, a navigable point of view that
puts her in condition to explore, inhabit and perceive a 3-D environment, enabling her to do what a
body usually does, the presence occurs.  Indeed, virtual objects do not appear as indecipherable
things located in an alien world, but rather as something familiar, ready to use, affordances relatives
to the possibilities of movement and sensorimotor skills of the digital body whose constraints have
been assimilated in player's body schema. In this sense, the avatar's body (i.e., camera) is like a
“vicarious body” allowing the player to execute intentional actions successfully, making the game
world familiar, habitable: “the avatar is the embodied manifestation of the player's engagement with
the game world; it is the player incarnated” (Klevjer 2007, p. 10).
We can think about the development of a 3-D enviroment in video games in order to understand
how it is relevant the camera-interface for the presence. Developers are able to draw the player's
avatars by two interfaces: first- or third-person perspective, where the avatar is nothing else than the
interfaces by which the player access to the game world, and where the size of player's gaze is the
camera's scope. In first-person perspective, the player's perspective overlaps with the camera (fig.
3), whereas in the third-person the camera (i.e., the avatar) is coupled with the character (fig. 4).
However, the character is just an prosthetic extension of the avatar, that is the camera. It is like a
muppet tied to the player by an invisible cord. So, the third-person perspective is actually a hidden
first-person device, in fact the real avatar is the camera by which the player controls the character.
Then, the camera represents a body – really different from a human body – by means which the
player's body is placed in the game world. 
Fig. 3. This is a 3-D environment in developing by Unity
3D.  The  capsule  which  you  can  see  is  a  first-person
perspective script,  whereas the camera is located upon it.
Indeed, the capsule is far from being a human body, but
regardless its shape, what is really important is its function:
providing the gamer a kind of body which enables her to
navigate in the 3D environment. 
Fig. 4.  Another 3-D environment in developing by Unity
3D. As you can see, we have a camera coupled with a 3-D
model  of  the  character  (camera  is  behind  it).  In  fact,  in
Unity  the  designer  can  make  a  game  object  a  child  of
another one, which means it will move anytime the father
will  move.  The  player's  perspective  is  still  provided  by
camera's scope, whereas the character (i.e., child's camera)
turns in an its extension.  
Even in a really poor 3-D environment, if the user can control an avatar by a camera, she feels
presence. Even when she can only perform very simple acts such as moving or jumping. Why? I
suggest the user begins to feel presence because, by the navigable camera, she is able to move in a
3-D  environment,  that  means  she  can  cause  by  movements  some  sensory  effects  (sensory
feedbacks) detectable in an egocentric space. The player experiences being there because there are
an intrinsic coherence between movements and sensory effects. Still, even when the environment is
bare, almost immediately the user feels it like familiar, or habitable. This happens because the user
finds regular correlations between enacted movements and sensory feedbacks, which can be used,
once assimilated in body schema and turned in sensorimotor skills, to realize plans or achieve goals.
Of course in an almost-empty 3-D environment, the presence is a weak experience that tends to be
broken very easily.  For instance,  consider  this  simple interactive 3-D environment  designed by
myself (fig. 5). The user is an agent who walks and jumps in a 3-D zero-gravity environment, a
little sandy satellite orbiting around an exoplanet. In spite of the artlessness of this scenario, I feel
presence because of the navigable camera and the real-time control of avatar. Nevertheless, after a
while, the presence tends to vanish. Indeed, I suggest this kind of experience must be always, as it
were, powered, but how? Probably, more are the things that the user can do in the environment, and
more extended is the sense of control on avatar and game world, and more the feeling of being will
tend to strengthen and remain.   By “more things”,  I mean that the player must be engaged by
achieving her intentions or plans, while the virtual environment must be responsive to her actions.
So, if the camera device is necessary to feel presence, at the same time achievable intentions and
plans are equally important to stabilize and enhance it. 
Fig. 5. This is a very poor 3-D environment, wherein the
avatar can only walking and jumping.  However,  the user
can  feel  presence  for  a  while,  and  this  happens  for  two
reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  the  player  feel  habitable  this
strange  space  because  finds  lawful  sensorimotor
correlations interacting with it.  On the  other  hands,  once
they are assimilated, those sensorimotor correlations can be
used as sensorimotor skills to realize plans or achieve goals.
Unfortunately, the player cannot find goals or activities in
this  interactive  simulation,  so  the  presence  tends  to
disappear very quickly. 
Probably, game designers have different strategies to encourage the immersion as presence in their
games. One of them is the storyline, where the player has to do many things in order to advance in
the story. Another one could be placing in the environment a huge set of activities. So in a simple
game where we have nothing to do but jumping and moving probably the presence will fade away
soon. Nevertheless, by developing 3-D environments where game designers drive players to do
different and subdivided activities, or to read an exacting plot, the experience of presence can be
invigorated and extended.
Conclusions: virtualising  the embodied experience
How can the player own a body in a game environment and, at the same time, being located in the
physical space? How can she experience of being there, in a virtual environment, if her physical
body is situated in the real environment? For example, how can she experience of moving in the
virtual world if she is physically static and seated? 
It  seems a paradoxical  situation  that  can be solved by reinterpreting  the embodied  experience.
According to  Pierre  Lévy,  media virtualise  the body,  that  is  to  say they make it  “in  potency”,
disclosing new undetermined possibilities to discover and create. The lived body is so multiplied,
transformed, modified,  virtualised in  new meaningful shapes (Lévy,  1995):  there is  not a fixed
shape of the body, it is mere potentialities that can be discovered and actualized by interacting with
new media. The embodied experience in everyday life is therefore just a particular actualization of
the body, one of its ways of being. For, in virtue of new media, such as computer games, the body
has discovered new shapes of giving itself, extending, interacting. That's why, on the one hand,
computer games, just like any other media that puts in motion the virtualisation, de-territorializes
the experience of body. Such an experience does not identify only with the physical body hooked to
local environment, but it gives itself also in remote, virtual, or shared environments. The human
agent is all of these bodily shapes, shifting the attention on one or other, depending her needs and
interests. 
Who thinks that embodied experience is reduced to the physical body ignores the fact that media
virtualise the experience of body, they make it “in potency” with new shapes that disclose new
spaces  of  interaction  and meaning.  In  this  sense,  Levy's  hyper-body reminds  closely  Merleau-
Ponty's  lived body. According to Merleau-Ponty,  my body can be an undefined shape that  can
assume a specific configuration when polarized by one of its tasks: the body exists towards its own
purposes and modifies itself dynamically in order to achieve them (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). That
means due to interactive interface, the experience of body extends in the game world when the
agent tends to realizes goals within it. 
The physical presence in an environment is not more “real” than the tele-presence or immersion in a
virtual  reality.  Perceptual-motor  loop of the intentional  action takes  place both in  physical  and
mediated environment, there are not intrinsic differences in the stimuli coming from both kinds of
environment (Ijsselsteijn and Riva, 2003). The fact that we can feel being in an environment rather
than another  depends only  on  which  perception  overwhelms the  other:  the  computer-generated
ambient  and  the  local  environment  compete  for  perceiver's  attentional  resources,  and  the  tele-
presence  occurs  when  more  attentional  resources  are  allocated  in  the  perception  of  mediated
environment (Draper, Kaber and Usher, 1999). 
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